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INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND EVIDENTIARY
STANDARDS IN THE INSPECTION OF SYRIA’S CHEMICAL
WEAPONS
Leah Paisner∗
ABSTRACT
In 2002, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) submitted an
unclassified report to Congress, pursuant to § 721 of the FY 97 Intelligence
Authorization Act, affirming the existence of Syria’s chemical weapons
stockpile and its continued pursuit of chemical weapons precursors. Other
states have also acknowledged that the Syrian government acquired its
chemical weapons arsenal prior to the August 21, 2013 chemical attack
against civilians in the Ghouta agricultural belt. However, the full extent of the
threat posed was unknown. Even after the attack, the U.S. government was
reluctant to intervene militarily. Drawing on its experience in Iraq, the U.S.
refused to take action until it had “clear and convincing evidence” that Syria
had used chemical weapons against civilians, crossing the proverbial “red
line.” This article will analyze the role of U.S. intelligence information and
evidentiary standards in determining whether the U.S. government has a
reasonable basis for intervening in Syria in the event of a subsequent breach of
the Chemical Weapons Convention.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2002, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) submitted an
unclassified report to Congress, pursuant to § 721 of the FY 97 Intelligence
Authorization Act, affirming the existence of Syria’s chemical weapons
stockpile and its continued pursuit of chemical weapons precursors.1 This
report fell in line with similar assessments from other states acknowledging
that the Syrian government acquired its chemical weapons arsenal prior to the
August 21, 2013 chemical attack against civilians in the Ghouta agricultural
belt.2 However, the full extent of the threat posed was unknown. Even after the
attack, the U.S. government was reluctant to intervene militarily.3 Drawing on
its experience in Iraq, the U.S. refused to take action until it had what it
considered clear and convincing evidence that Syria had used chemical
weapons against civilians, thereby crossing the proverbial “red line.”4 This
article will analyze the role of U.S. intelligence information and evidentiary
standards in determining whether the U.S. government has a reasonable basis
for intervening in Syria in the event of a subsequent breach of the Chemical
Weapons Convention.
I. BACKGROUND
What initially began as a people’s rebellion three years ago has transformed
into a bloody civil conflict with upwards of 191,000 civilian casualties and a
1 DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR ANALYSIS, C.I.A., UNCLASSIFIED REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY RELATING TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND
ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS, 1 JANUARY THROUGH 30 JUNE 2002, at 1, 8 (2003), available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/721report_jan-june2002.pdf.
2 See, e.g., Richard Engel et al., Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal remains a menacing mystery, NBC
News (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/syrias-chemical-weapons-arsenal-remainsmenacing-mystery-f8C11078068.
3 Sabrina Siddiqui & Michael McAuliff, Obama’s Pitch To Congress On Syria Fails To Sway Senators,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/10/obama-congress-syria_n_
3902407.html.
4 See Peter Baker et al., Off-the-Cuff Obama Line Put U.S. in Bind on Syria, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2013,
at A1.
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spillover of over two million refugees into neighboring states.5 United States
analysts, however, did not anticipate a conflict of this magnitude; instead,
during the early stages of the fighting, many assessed that Syrian President
Bashar al-Assad would be forced from power.6 With military support from
Hezbollah and material aid from Iran and Russia, regime forces have managed
to make several tactical gains and counterattacks against rebel forces.7 The
success of the Syrian regime’s counteroffensive strategy has been categorized
by its aerial and artillery shelling of civilian neighborhoods where rebel forces
are based, extrajudicial executions, the torture of activists and rebel fighters,
and the use of sophisticated chemical weaponry.8
On August 30, 2013, the U.S. government announced that they had “high
confidence” that the Syrian regime had conducted a massive chemical weapons
assault a week prior against civilians living in the Ghouta agricultural belt (an
area surrounding the eastern and southern suburbs of Damascus).9 Based on
unclassified U.S. and French intelligence reports, the regime forces had used
surface-to-surface rockets to deliver a large-scale payload of sarin gas.10 Sarin
5 JEREMY M. SHARP & CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33487, ARMED
CONFLICT IN SYRIA: BACKGROUND AND U.S. RESPONSE 4 (2013), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/214423.pdf; Laura Smith-Spark, With more than 191,000 dead in Syria, U.N. rights chief slams
global 'paralysis', CNN NEWS (Aug. 22, 2014), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/22/world/meast/syria-conflict/
index.html?hpt=imi_c2.
6 Summary of JEREMY M. SHARP & CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33487,
ARMED CONFLICT IN SYRIA: BACKGROUND AND U.S. RESPONSE 4 (2013), available at http://fpc.state.gov/
documents/organization/214423.pdf.
7 See id.
8 See id. (observing that the Assad regime still holds a tactical advantage in regards to its aerial, artillery,
and defensive capabilities); Hwaida Saad & Rick Gladstone, Qaeda-Linked Insurgents Clash With Other
Rebels in Syria, as Schism Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2014, at A8 (reporting the killing and torturing of rebel
activists and fighters).
9 Press Release, U.S. Office of the Press Secretary, Government Assessment of the Syrian
Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013 (Aug. 30, 2013) (on file with U.S. Office of the
Press Secretary), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/30/governmentassessment-syrian-government-s-use-chemical-weapons-august-21; Summary of MARY BETH D. NIKITIN ET
AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42848, SYRIA’S CHEMICAL WEAPONS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2013), available
at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R42848.pdf (commenting that the attack occurred near rebel held areas, but was
directed primarily at civilian populations).
10 Press Release, Council on Foreign Relations, French Government’s Declassified Intelligence
Assessment on Chemical Weapons Attack in Syria (2013) (on file with the Council on Foreign Relations),
available at http://www.cfr.org/syria/french-governments-declassified-intelligence-assessment-chemicalweapons-attack-syria/p31335 (providing that the Syrian government has Scud C, Scud B, M600, and SS21
missiles, which are capable of delivering sarin and other chemical weapon payloads ranging anywhere
between 70 to 500 kilometers in distance); Press Release, U.S. Office of the Press Secretary, Government
Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013 (Aug. 30, 2013) (on
file with the U.S. Office of the Press Secretary), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
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is an extremely toxic nerve agent that causes muscle overstimulation in its
victims, which, in turn, may result in irreparable neurological damage or even
death.11 The various intelligence communities have estimated that the death
toll could range from anywhere between 350 to around 1500 fatalities, a
substantial portion of whom were civilians.12 The regime’s deliberate actions
crossed the U.S. government’s proverbial “red line,” the official threshold that
would trigger direct intervention in the conflict.13
Chemical weapons are an easy type of catastrophic weaponry to build, and
are completely indiscriminate in the scope of their destruction.14 Most
commonly termed the “poor man’s atomic bomb,” chemical weapons have a
long, sordid history on the battlefield, originating from Germany’s use of
chlorine gas against British troops during World War I and leading up to the
Iraqi government-led chemical attack on the Kurdish people in Halabja.15 Yet,
chemical weapons have more value as instruments of terror than tools of
warfare.16 Their intended function is to terrorize, subjugate, and annihilate
unarmed populations without leaving a mark on the vital infrastructure in the
office/2013/08/30/government-assessment-syrian-government-s-use-chemical-weapons-august-21 (noting that
the evidence for the August 21 attack was based on human intelligence (HUMINT), signals (SIGINT), social
media documentation, and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT)).
11 DANA A. SHEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42862, CHEMICAL WEAPONS: A SUMMARY REPORT OF
CHARACTERISTICS AND EFFECTS, 3 (2013) (nerve agents, such as sarin, may enter the body either through
inhalation or direct skin contact, but are far more deadly if inhaled).
12 See NIKITIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 1, 15 (commenting that the French intelligence community’s
methodology for calculating the death toll are akin to similar models that put the number closer to a total of
1,500 casualties).
13 See SHARP & BLANCHARD, supra note 5, at 16 (observing that the U.S. government has a national
security interest in holding states accountable for their actions when they deliberately violate international
norms on chemical weapons).
14 LORD LYELL, NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: THE POOR MAN’S
BOMB, (1996), http://fas.org/irp/threat/an253stc.htm; Barry Kellman, Bridling the International Trade of
Catastrophic Weaponry, 43 AM. U.L. REV. 755, 762 (1994) (noting that while chemical weapons may be
referred to as the “poor man’s atomic bomb,” they have seen more extensive use on the battlefield than nuclear
weapons).
15 See id. at 762–63 (describing chemical weapon use from World War I to Iraqi attack on the Kurdish
people, and additionally pointing out that, despite their offensive capabilities against human populations,
chemical weapons have little to no destructive power against military facilities or depots); Paul Schulte, When
chemical weapons killed 90,000, CNN (July 9, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/09/opinion/schultechemical-weapons-world-war-i/ (describing Germany’s use of chlorine gas against the British in World War
I).
16 See Kellman, supra note 14, at 762–63; see also LYELL, supra note 14 (noting that the first large-scale
use of chemical weapons on the battlefield was in 1915 during the Battle of Langemarck, when the German
army fired approximately 171 tons of chlorine gas on the Russian army, killing over 5,000 soldiers; yet, the
strength of chemicals weapons developed after the Great War has increased exponentially, such that newer
chemical agents, such as VX, can produce the same number of casualties at much smaller doses).
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surrounding areas.17 Thus, the universal prohibition of chemical weapons use
is based on this principle, which, in turn, forms the foundation for all related
international treaties and conventions.18
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is the primary legally binding,
international document which aims to fully eliminate chemical weapons
through regulating their development, production, stockpiling, and use by
states.19 International regulatory regimes, such as the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), have the jurisdiction to evaluate
state compliance with the CWC by conducting intrusive, systematic
inspections of chemical facilities.20 The Technical Secretariat of the OPCW
also has the authority to order the installation of monitoring equipment or
systems in declared chemical production facilities, and challenge states to
verify their compliance with the CWC.21 However, the OPCW faces a
profoundly different set of challenges than its non-proliferation counterparts
because the size of the global chemical and pharmaceutical industries hampers
its efforts to regulate the flow of precursors.22 As a consequence, the CWC’s
verification procedures must be exceptionally invasive and systematic, such
that even state parties without weapons production facilities are required to
undergo constant inspection for any evidence of clandestine activity.23
17 See Kellman, supra note 14, at 763 (noting that chemical weapons have a greater military utility than
other catastrophic weapons because of their effectiveness in subduing a rebellious population without harming
vital infrastructure); see also Colonel Guy B. Roberts, The Counterproliferation Self-Help Paradigm: A Legal
Regime for Enforcing the Norm Prohibiting the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 27 DENV. J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 483, 493–94 (1999).
18 See Roberts, supra note 17, at 535–36 (observing that the prohibition of chemical weapons use may be
considered a non-derogable, international legal norm due to its near universal acceptance among states).
19 The Convention on the Prohibition, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction, pmbl., opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M.800, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter
CWC] (providing that the elimination of chemical weapons may be achieved through the concerted effort of
the international community in regulating the global trade of chemicals and deterring states from using and
resuming chemical weapons production).
20 See Kellman, supra note 14, at 812 (noting that the CWC facilitates the verification process by
separating chemicals into three inspection schedules based on their potential military use and legitimate
commercial applications; accordingly, key chemical precursors that could be converted for chemical weapons
use are included in the same schedule as actual warfare agents).
21 Id. at 813–14 (declaring that states under inspection have the legal obligation to make a good faith
effort to demonstrate compliance with the CWC; if they are unable to do so, the OPCW will give the inspected
state a twelve hour notice that an inspection team is on its way).
22 See id. at 812 (noting that the types of chemical precursors that may be used in the production of
weapons are so diverse that regulatory regimes’ efforts to curb their use must be “more extensive and intrusive
than those for nuclear weapons”).
23 See id. (observing that the CWC represents a two-pronged approach of regulating the flow of
chemicals, and of verifying the non-production of chemical weapons).
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The success of the CWC rides, however, not on vague assurances that its
guidelines are being followed, but on the extent of international legal
cooperation between state parties and the strength of export regulations.24
Proliferators may escape the watchful eye of OPCW inspectors by segmenting
the production of chemical weapons—in other words, distributing production
operations across a number of facilities in multiple states.25 Moreover, states
with sophisticated chemical and pharmaceutical industries may easily divert
legitimate civilian production facilities to manufacture agents of warfare.26 To
meet its main objective of subjugating a rebellious population, a proliferator
state will also require a means of delivering the chemical payload.27 Often, if
the state’s primary objective is to terrorize, technical requirements for
controlling the delivery device’s strength and precision will fall by the
wayside.28
Effective export controls systems are vital in achieving the CWC’s goals.
In the United States, the Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade
Controls is the office responsible for implementing the CWC’s aims in the
form of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).29 Under ITAR,
the State Department reviews license applications on a case-by-case basis to
weigh whether certain exports pose a risk to national security interests or may
be used as a precursor in the production of chemical weaponry.30
Simultaneously, the State Department regulates the export of dual-use exports,
which may be converted to military use, by tracking their path, confronting the
exporter state about their existence, or even cancelling the associated

24 See id. at 836–37 (arguing that since proliferators will always find ways to subvert OPCW inspections,
state signatories should provide legal assistance and information to one another to ensure that states are
complying with the CWC’s verification procedures).
25 See, e.g., Robert Bejesky, Intelligence Information and Judicial Evidentiary Standards, 44 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 811, 845 (2011) (observing that during the late 1990s, the U.S. National Intelligence Estimates (NIE)
alleged on several occasions that Iraq could easily transform legitimate dual-use industrial plants into facilities
for the clandestine manufacture of chemical weapons if it possessed a stockpile of certain chemical
precursors).
26 See LYELL, supra note 14 (noting that facilities for the manufacture of “fertilizers, pharmaceuticals,
and petrochemicals” may all be easily diverted to the production of chemical weapons).
27 See id. (delivery devices may take the form of traditional weaponry, such as artillery shells or missiles,
but may also take more unconventional forms, such as the plastic containers used by the Aum Shinri Kyo
during the 1995 Tokyo sarin gas attack).
28 Id. (states that plan to use chemical weapons primarily for some military objective will place greater
priority on designing delivery devices that “optimiz[e] payload size and the means of dispersing the agent”).
29 See Overview of the U.S. Export Control System, A RESOURCE ON STRATEGIC TRADE MANAGEMENT
AND EXPERT CONTROLS, http://www.state.gov/strategictrade/overview/ (last visited July 22, 2014).
30 Id.
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transaction, thereby constraining their flow across the U.S. border.31 Yet,
unilateral and multilateral export control regimes rely on the effective
exchange of information between state parties.32 If the United States were to
intervene into the Syrian conflict, it would need to demonstrate that its actions
were justified by timely and credible intelligence about the existence of
chemical weapons.33
Although export control regimes may unearth evidence that a state has
breached its disarmament obligations, the international community will be
unable to act in full confidence unless it has veritable intelligence reports on
the size and location of the chemical weapons arsenal inside the state.34
According to an unclassified report, Syria has been developing its chemical
weapons arsenal “for many years;” yet, the origin and location of its stockpiles
has long been a matter of contention.35 In 1995, the intelligence community
assessed that Syria had been developing a self-sustaining chemical weapons
program since the mid-1980s; by 1997, however, the Department of Defense
shifted gears and released a report stating the program traced back to the
1970s.36 During this period, the Soviet Union and several private corporations
in Europe helped fund Syria’s burgeoning chemical weapons program by
supplying chemical precursors, delivery devices, equipment, and technical
training.37 By the 1990s, the intelligence community yet again changed its
tone, reporting that Syria was working toward “independent chemical warfare
capability.”38
As intelligence piled up, reports on the size of the stockpile became more
specific: in 2012, the French intelligence community asserted that Syria had
amassed over 1000 metric tons of chemical agents and precursors, including
31

Id.
See Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came in from the Cold War: Intelligence and International Law,
27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1071, 1093–94 (2006) (U.S. intelligence agencies rely on an expansive network of allies
for information, despite the intelligence apparatus’ immense size and breadth of resources).
33 See Hannah Allam & Mark Seibel, To some, US case for Syrian gas attack, strike has too many holes,
MCCLATCHY DC (Sept. 2, 2013), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/09/02/201027/to-some-us-case-forsyrian-gas.html.
34 See, e.g., Bejesky, supra note 25, at 818–19 (explaining that the U.S. had no direct evidence of
biological weapons in Iraq, yet “estimates generated perceptions of breach of disarmament resolutions, . . .
while inability to verify intelligence reporting amid precautionary uncertainty begat a chasm between
preexisting estimates and later evidentiary findings”).
35 NIKITIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 3, 11.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 4.
38 Id.
32
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hundreds of metric tons of sarin, mustard agent, and VX.39 This announcement
came a few months after the U.S. Director of National Intelligence James
Clapper declared to the Senate Armed Services Committee that Syria had
developed a sophisticated network of chemical facilities across the state, but
lacked independent chemical warfare capability.40 Accordingly, Syria has
remained reliant on foreign sources for key chemical precursors and
equipment.41 Even so, while the various intelligence communities agreed that
Syria had developed a sophisticated chemical weapons program, they diverged
over the full extent of its capabilities.42
In the decade leading up to the conflict in Syria, the State Department and
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) offered conflicting
accounts about the types of weapons delivery devices the regime possessed.
Notably, a 2008 State Department report assessed that Syria had hundreds of
Scud B, Scud C, Scud D, and SS-21 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs),
which could deliver chemical payloads.43 Subsequent reports in 2009 and
2013, however, contradicted these statements, and instead articulated that only
Syria’s Scud D and SS-21 SRBMs could be outfitted with chemical
warheads.44 Even after the August 21 attack on the Ghouta agricultural belt,
intelligence about what types of SRBMs could have delivered the sarin used to
carry out the attack was still sparse.45 To compound matters further, the sarin
could have been delivered by another type of tactical munitions, namely BM21 multiple rocket launchers, which are better equipped for rapidly discharging
nerve agents from a short range into a crowded area.46
Intelligence estimates also indicated that the exact composition of Syria’s
weapons stockpile is unknown due to uncertainty over the type of chemicals
39

See id. at 5 (Syria was reportedly developing a nerve agent with a higher toxicity level than sarin).
See id. at 5–6 (providing that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director Michael Flynn
reiterated Director Clapper’s assertions when testifying before Congress in April 2013).
41 Id. at 5.
42 See DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 7 (“We assess
that Syria remains dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its [chemical weapons] program,
including precursor chemicals.”).
43 See NIKITIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 6.
44 See NATIONAL AIR AND SPACE INTELLIGENCE CENTER, BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILE THREAT 11,
13 (2009), available at http://fas.org/irp/threat/missile/naic/NASIC2009.pdf (Syria possesses fewer than 100
SS-21 and 435 Scud D SRBMs); NATIONAL AIR AND SPACE INTELLIGENCE CENTER, BALLISTIC AND CRUISE
MISSILE THREAT 13 (2013), available at http://www.afisr.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-130710-054.pdf
(approximately 100 road-mobile Scud D SRBMs with a maximum range of 700 kilometers).
45 See NIKITIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 6.
46 See id. at 7 (contrasting rocket launchers—which are better designed for battlefield use against rebel
forces, with SRBMs—which are more intended for an attack on a neighboring state).
40
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the country possesses.47 Whether chemical weapons can be immediately
deployed for military use is contingent on whether the nerve agents in the
munitions are in unitary or binary form.48 For instance, a 1991 National
Intelligence Estimate announced that Syria had produced binary Scud
warheads and aerial bombs, which could be deployed as soon as the remaining
chemical precursors are combined in the munitions.49 In contrast, if Syria
possessed unitary weapons—in which the chemical agent is already
prepared—estimates of the total size of its stockpile could be more imprecise.50
Unitary munitions, however, are vastly more dangerous for the soldiers
responsible for mixing and handling the chemical agents.51
As the head of state, Bashar al-Assad has the presidential authority to order
the development of chemical weaponry, as well as to appoint members of the
Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC)—the organization
responsible for managing the state’s chemical weapons program.52 Within the
Center, Branch 450 has been identified as the unit tasked with preparing and
securing chemical munitions used in the August 21 attack.53 Although the
Syrian government has been silent on whether it possesses chemical weapons
for decades, by September 10, 2013, the government admitted that it possessed

47

See id. at 8.
See Breaking Down Chemical Weapons, One Fact at a Time, NPR (Sept. 14, 2013), http://www.npr.
org/2013/09/14/222511299/breaking-down-chemical-weapons-one-fact-at-a-time (although a chemist with
limited materials could easily synthesize chemical weapons, only actors with access to a significant amount of
resources can manufacture the amount necessary for military use).
49 See DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, CIA, PROSPECTS FOR SPECIAL WEAPONS: PROLIFERATION
AND CONTROL NO. NIE5-91C/11, at 6 (1991), in 2 DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE, ANNEXES (1991), available at http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/
116907.
50 See NIKITIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 8 (observing that unitary munitions may be stored in bulk or premixed, and are slower to deploy, since it may take a substantial amount of time to prepare “battlefield
quantities” of unitary warheads).
51 Id.
52 Press Release, U.S. Office of the Press Secretary, Government Assessment of the Syrian
Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013 (Aug. 30, 2013) (on file with U.S. Office of the
Press Secretary), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/30/governmentassessment-syrian-government-s-use-chemical-weapons-august-21 (the government had “high confidence”
that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad directed the attack on the Ghouta countryside).
53 Adam Entous et al., Elite Syrian Unit Scatters Chemical Arms Stockpile, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2013,
at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324755104579071330713553794?
mod=WSJ_hps_LEFTTopStories&mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB
10001424127887324755104579071330713553794.html%3Fmod%3DWSJ_hps_LEFTTopStories.
48
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a chemical weapons stockpile.54 Further, it agreed to sign the Chemical
Weapons Convention, and invited international inspectors to come inspect the
locations of the weapons sites.55 However, the Syrian government’s promises
were far from assuring, as the intelligence community still is unable to
determine the location of all munitions with full certainty.56
On December 5, 2013, the United Nations implicated the Syrian military
for conducting four additional chemical attacks leading up to the August 21
attack on the Ghouta countryside—an allegation that the Syrian government
had previously refuted.57 Though the United Nations Mission had requested the
government’s permission to investigate Khan al-Assal—the location of an
earlier, alleged attack—it was unable to enter the town due to ongoing clashes
between insurgents and the government.58 The Syrian government further
frustrated weapons inspectors’ attempts to carry out their mission by restricting
their movement to Khan al-Assal, thereby calling the OPCW’s ability into
question.59 And unless the intelligence community discovers clear,
substantiated evidence of the Syrian government’s continued use or
maintenance of chemical weapons stockpiles, the international community’s
response will be ultimately restrained.60
II. ANALYSIS
Drawing on lessons learned during the Iraq War, the U.S. government and
the international community are hesitant to act on unsubstantiated reports
without clear evidence that Syria possesses or employs chemical weapons.61
After the intelligence fallout during the Iraq War, the former Director of the
54 See Anne Barnard, In Shift, Syrian Official Admits Government Has Chemical Arms, N.Y. TIMES ,
Sept. 11, 2013, at A10 (reporting that the Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Moallem admitted that the Syrian
government possessed chemical weapons).
55 See id.
56 NIKITIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 11 (quoting statements made by the British Defense Secretary and the
U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor on the suspected locations of munitions sites).
57 Somini Sengupta and Rick Gladstone, U.N. Reports Attacks Using Chemicals in Syria, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 13, 2013, at A12.
58 See id. (explaining that insurgent fighters linked to Al-Qaeda seized the surrounding area, preventing
weapons inspectors from gaining access).
59 See Rick Gladstone, Delay Foreseen in Removing Syrian Chemicals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2013, at
A8.
60 See Bejesky, supra note 25, at 814 (referencing statements made by the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence about the evidence leading up to the Iraq War).
61 See 60 Minutes: George Tenet: At the Center of the Storm, (CBS television broadcast Apr. 29, 2007),
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/george-tenet-at-the-center-of-the-storm/ (interview on the
intelligence fallout leading up to the Iraq War).
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Central Intelligence Agency George Tenet was interviewed about the
distinction between judicial opinions and national security determinations.62
While national security estimates and judicial opinions resemble each other in
how intelligence is used to analytically render decisions, their evidentiary
thresholds are different.63
Judicial opinions rely on the strength of parties’ evidence to present a
compelling argument, which is then used to obtain a legal remedy for a
specific harm.64 Information is verified vis-à-vis the adversarial nature of
proceedings, where the side that presents the most persuasive argument wins.65
In contrast, national security estimates are not subject to the same minimum
standards: the government has a substantially compelling interest in protecting
national security, and so wields a broader brush in presenting its case.66 Yet,
the government cannot demonstrate the veracity of evidence in the same
manner that parties do in court.67
Intelligence agencies are not required to authenticate classified information
before the public, nor are witnesses liable for perjuring their accounts of
facts.68 Threats to national security are evaluated by a multitude of foreign
government agencies that work with the U.S. in a intelligence sharing
alliances—some of which act in concert, others unilaterally in accordance with
internal operating procedures.69 Since the government’s case will inherently be
weaker than those in court, it has a higher evidentiary threshold for verifying
threats to national security.70 Therefore, the government’s reaction will be
tempered by the public’s willingness to accept the consequences of state
action.71
62 Id. Specifically, Tenet refers to the difference between evidence that is sufficient to win a criminal case
in court versus evidence sufficient to compile national security determinations. Id.
63 See Bejesky, supra note 25, at 813–14 (distinguishing between the evidentiary standards for judicial
decisions and national security estimates).
64 Id. (“Executive enforcement protects the integrity of the courts’ prescriptive jurisdiction, including for
decisions and processes that compel and verify information, such as with contempt orders and criminal
punishment for perjury and falsifying information.”).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 813–14.
67 Id. at 814.
68 Id.
69 See Chesterman, supra note 32, at 1093 (observing that intelligence sharing between agencies
increased as intelligence has become more integral to foreign policy decisions rendered in times of peace,
rather than war).
70 See Bejesky, supra note 25, at 814 (noting that the government’s ability to cooperate with national
security threats and at-risk witnesses may be limited, making intelligence estimates difficult to verify).
71 Id. (noting the theoretical underpinnings of the precautionary principle).

PAISNER GALLEYSFINAL

2034

1/30/2015 7:47 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

Similarly, most Congress members are not privy to national security
intelligence gathered by governmental agencies.72 Such information is
screened by the executive branch, whom is legally required to give “due regard
for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified
information . . . .”73 Even then, congressional committees have limited access
to specific intelligence that would justify military action.74 Although Congress
is constitutionally empowered to authorize the use of force, it lacks the
authority to oversee clandestine operations and verify the quality of
intelligence reports.75 Thus, findings by the intelligence community will not
meet the same evidentiary standards as findings in court.76 Yet, as the result of
intelligence failings during the Iraq War, the U.S. government has become
more wary of unilaterally using force without clear and convincing evidence
that a proliferator state has crossed the proverbial “red line,” and is in breach of
its international obligations.77
In the case of Iraq, Congress gathered most of its information justifying the
invasion from the Bush administration’s official statements and intelligence
community estimates.78 In mid-September 2002, Congress members requested
that the CIA produce a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the severity of
the threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).79 The
finalized NIE was kept confidential, but provided Congress with cursory

72 See Memorandum from Cong. Res. Serv. on Statutory Procedures Under Which Congress is to be
Informed of U.S. Intelligence Activities, Including Covert Actions to Congressional Clients 9 (Jan. 18, 2006),
available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m011806.pdf (noting that most political actors are restricted from
accessing confidential information so as to safeguard intelligence sources and methods).
73 Id.
74 Id. (commenting that Congress understands that the executive branch may need to withhold extremely
sensitive intelligence information and operations for the protection of national security).
75 See Bejesky, supra note 25, at 815 (contrasting Congress’ limited access to national security
information with its explicit power to declare war under the Constitution).
76 Id. at 816 (noting the NIEs do not elaborate as to how intelligence is gathered, and instead, merely
attest to the existence of the agencies’ sources and methods—similar to judicial opinions rendered during
closed court proceedings).
77 See id. at 817.
78 See id. at 815 (referencing President Bush’s September 2002 speech to the United Nations General
Assembly, arguing that Saddam Hussein posed a “grave and gathering danger” to international security).
79 See id. (pointing out that the NIE was prepared in just three weeks, and was rushed to Congress before
many of its findings could be challenged).
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findings of fact alluding to the existence of WMDs.80 Nevertheless, the origin
of the intelligence remained classified to both Congress and the public.81
On October 7, 2002, President George W. Bush substantiated the
intelligence in the NIE by declaring that the Iraqi government had
commissioned high-strength aluminum tubes to be used in the manufacture of
nuclear weapons.82 Moreover, the President announced that Iraq was
resurrecting its chemical and biological weapons programs, which could be
used to later supply munitions to al-Qaeda insurgents within the state.83
Relying on the accuracy of administration portrayals and the NIE declassified
version, Congress voted to authorize the invasion of Iraq.84
By November 2002, United Nations weapons inspectors had arrived on the
ground and began cooperating with Iraqi authorities in touring the alleged
facilities.85 While inspectors failed to uncover any incriminating evidence, they
admitted that it was possible that the Iraqi government had concealed the
weapons pursuant to an official “‘Denial and Deception’ program.”86 After
three months, the inspectors’ tones had changed: all physical inspection
findings on WMDs repudiated pre-war intelligence.87 Likewise, inspectors had
no direct evidence that the Iraqi government was planning to resurrect its
80 See Zachary D. Streit, Investigative Journalism and National Security: Secret Evidence and the Courts
in the Age of National Security, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 75, 87 (2006) (pointing out that fewer
than 10 congressmen actually viewed the NIE before authorizing the use of force in Iraq on those grounds).
81 See id. (noting that there is no congressional research service dedicated to publishing public versions
of classified intelligence reports, and that those congressmen who enjoy privileged access to the intelligence
must refrain from disclosing it to other members).
82 Press Release, U.S. Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat (Oct. 7, 2002)
(on file with the U.S. Office of the Press Secretary), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB80/new/doc%2012/President%20Bush%20Outlines%20Iraqi%20Threat.htm (declaring that the Iraqi
government and al-Qaeda operatives have maintained contact for over a decade and have cooperated in
planning explosive and chemical attacks).
83 See id. (arguing that previous attempts at weapons inspections during the early 1990s were met with
“systematic deception,” in which the Iraqi government engaged in duplicitous tactics—destroying evidence,
wiretapping investigators’ offices, and developing mobile munitions plants—to prevent the international
community from accessing the state’s illegal weapons stockpiles).
84 See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, H.R.J. Res. 114, 107th
Cong. (2002).
85 See Bejesky, supra note 25, at 817 (explaining that the inspection teams submitted biweekly reports on
their progress to the Security Council over the course of four months).
86 See id. (noting that the Bush administration maintained its stance that the Iraqi government possessed
WMDs, which were covertly moved prior to weapons inspections).
87 See Joel Roberts, Blix: U.S. was Certainty Suspect, CBS NEWS (Jun. 25, 2003), http://www.cbsnews.
com/news/blix-us-certainty-was-suspect/ (quoting the United Nations Chief Weapons Inspector Hans Blix as
saying that the U.S. and British governments had “100 percent certainty about the weapons of mass
destruction’s existence, and zero certainty about where they are”).
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chemical weapons program, and instead determined that it had actually
destroyed its chemical weapons stockpile in 1991.88 As a result of the lack of
incriminating evidence, the inspection teams could not prove that the Iraqi
government possessed or had the intention to possess WMDs,89 nor could they
unequivocally demonstrate that Iraq breached its disarmament resolutions.90
Over the course of time, the NIE transformed from a “high confidence”
intelligence report to an unsubstantiated, evidentially weak document,
containing assertions that held no water.91 Unsubstantiated reports that the
Iraqi government attempted to procure dual-use equipment were woven into
stories of active WMD facilities, whose existence threatened the very fabric of
international order.92 The only evidence that corroborated the claim that Iraq
tried to obtain aluminum tubes for WMD production was a proposal for a
uranium enrichment plant, whose design was based on fifty-year-old lab report
results.93 Likewise, though it would take Iraq over ten years to enrich fissile
material for a WMD, falsified reports about a nonexistent Iraq-Niger raw
uranium deal made the threat seem imminent.94
Iraq’s chemical and biological weapon stockpiles, if still in existence,
would likely have decomposed sometime between the end of the Gulf War and
the date that the NIE was released.95 Even if the inspection teams in the early
1990s had not detected the chemical and biological stocks, only mustard agents
would have been able to survive for that long of a period.96 Although scientists
and other experts could have easily repudiated this allegation, it remained in
88

See Bejesky, supra note 25, at 818–19.
See SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, CIA, COMPREHENSIVE REPORT
OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE DCI ON IRAQ’S WMD: IRAQ’S CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAM 1 (2004),
available at http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0001156478.pdf
(stating that although the inspection teams found that the Iraqi government possessed the capability to produce
nerve agents within a two-year period, it had no evidence that it planned to obtain the essential chemical
precursors through its “existing procurement networks for sanctioned items”).
90 See Bejesky, supra note 25, at 818–19 (noting that any desire that the Iraqi government may have had
to manufacture WMDs was stifled by harsh sanctions and the specter of international condemnation).
91 See id. at 845–46 (pointing out that prior to 1999, the NIE was regarded as the “most comprehensive”
assessment of Iraq’s chemical weapons stockpile).
92 Id.
93 See DAVID ALBRIGHT, ISIS, IRAQ’S ALUMINUM TUBES, SEPARATING FACT FROM FICTION 10 (2003),
available at http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/IraqAluminumTubes12-5-03.pdf (drawing on
similarities between aluminum tubes allegedly procured by Iraq and Zippe-type centrifuges manufactured in
the early 1950s).
94 See Bejesky, supra note 25 at 835.
95 Id. at 846–47 (many scientists and experts attested that the majority of chemical and biological agents
would have decomposed within a five-year span).
96 Id. at 846.
89
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the NIE as a credible piece of intelligence.97 Similarly, indistinct satellite
photographs of a tanker truck were repeatedly purported to be evidence of
“decontamination vehicles” used in the transport of chemical weapons.98 Thus,
the images were held up as evidence that the Iraqi government was still
manufacturing chemical weapons.99
Human intelligence was equally lacking: a single witness supplied
information on mobile biological weapons facilities for 112 different
intelligence reports,100 even though none of his stories were verified by U.S.
intelligence officials.101 Although witnesses undergo cross-examination so the
court may extract the truth from their conflicting testimonies, here, the human
intelligence was both classified and uncorroborated.102 The sensitive nature of
intelligence inherently prevents actors from determining the authenticity of
information.103 Each assertion is regarded as unassailable, because it was
gathered in the name of national security.104 Yet, the lack of applicable
evidentiary standards allowed senior administration officials to misuse
exaggerated intelligence estimates to justify a costly military incursion.105 If
intelligence is considered probative without first being thoroughly scrutinized,
the government may use classified reports to justify policy initiatives, while
avoiding the public’s critical eyes.106

97

Id. at 847.
See U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY’S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ, S. REP. NO.
108-301, at 200–01 (2004), available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/108301.pdf (providing the sole
evidence of alleged chemical weapons transports across Iraq).
99 Id. at 201. However, the report also notes that several CIA analysts and UN inspectors pointed out that
the alleged decontamination vehicles could have been water trucks with legitimate civilian functions. Id.
100 Bejesky, supra note 25, at 876.
101 S. Rep. No. 108-301, supra note 98, at 188 (providing that the NIE overstated the intelligence on the
Iraqi government’s alleged mobile biological weapons facilities).
102 See Bejesky, supra note 25, at 876.
103 See id. at 877 (declaring that senior administration officials rationalized the dearth of credible evidence
as the result of the Iraqi government’s alleged “denial and deception” policy).
104 Id. (explaining that unsubstantiated reports treated as evidence of dire security threats effectively
coerced the American public and international community to act).
105 See id. (“The Administration exploited [its] declassification authority in the lead up to the war and
disclosed intelligence at a time and in a manner of its choosing with impunity, knowing that others attempting
to disclose additional details that might provide balance or improve accuracy would be prevented from doing
so under the threat of prosecution.”).
106 See id. at 881.
98
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CONCLUSION
As the result of lessons learned during the Iraq War, the U.S. government
has become more hesitant to unilaterally use force against a proliferator state
without verified intelligence that the state has crossed the “red line.” The U.S.
government is presently employing a higher evidentiary standard for
determining whether Syria is in breach of its international obligations under the
CWC, with greater reliance on evidence gathered from multilateral export
control arrangements and the OPCW. However, intelligence gathering by U.S.
agencies still remains a largely opaque process, even in developing the case for
the use of force in Syria. While increased congressional oversight may be
difficult to administer, the U.S. government may need to consider ways to
improve intelligence verification processes to avoid its mistakes of the past. To
defend international security abroad, the U.S. government must first protect the
integrity of intelligence agencies at home. Otherwise, the case for future action
in Syria may be built on unstable, evidentiary grounds.

